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Roman Law and the Early Historiography of International Law: 
Ward, Wheaton, Hosack and Walker 
 
Randall Lesaffer1 





The significance of Roman law for the evolution of international law is an issue as complex as it is 
contentious. It has two main dimensions: the continuity between Roman ‘international law’ and that of later 
times and the impact of Roman private law on the further development of international law.  As several 
legal historians and international lawyers of the 20th century – among whom Hersch Lauterpacht is 
foremost – have indicated, modern concerns about international law have often steered and overshadowed 
the historical debate. 
In this article, the works of four Anglo-American historians of international law from the 19th century 
are analysed in relation to Roman law. These early historians of international law all viewed the question of 
the Roman contribution to modern international law in terms of their understanding of that law. As was the 
case during the 20th century, and as Lauterpacht had claimed, the discussion on Roman law reflected the 
great debate between positivists and naturalists. Of course, each waged the debate in the terms of his day 
and age. None of these authors reduced international law to the positive public international law of the 19th 
century, based upon the sovereign State. None of them was over-concerned with consensualism and 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to the Board and Directors of the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at the 
University of Cambridge. Their hospitality, once again, allowed me to write this paper in the best of 
surroundings. I thank James Crawford (Cambridge University) as well as Benjamin Straumann (New York 
University) for their comments. 
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voluntarism, at least not directly. The central issue was the other one Lauterpacht had forwarded: the 





In the historical debate on continuity and universality of international law, the question of 
the significance of Roman law for the formation of international law looms large. The 
topic is as complex as it is contentious. 
 A first issue of contention regards the historical continuity between the 
‘international law’ of the Roman Era and that of medieval and modern Europe. Many 
modern historians of international law see but little impact of Roman ‘international law’ 
and underscore the fundamental differences between the Roman and the modern 
conceptions of international law and relations. Among them are Wilhelm Grewe, Arthur 
Nussbaum and Antonio Truyol y Serra, or, more recently, David Bederman.3 On the 
                                                 
2 Throughout the article, I will regularly use the term ‘international law’ in an abstract way, referring to all 
bodies of law governing relations between independent bodies politic, regardless of the area or era in which 
they applied. 
3 David Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge 2001) 4-6; Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs 
of International Law (Berlin/New York 2000) 9; Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of 
Nations (New York 1947) 1-2; Antonio Truyol y Serra, Histoire du droit international public (Paris 1995) 
11-18. 
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opposite side, are those focusing on elements of similarity and continuity, chiefly among 
them Wolfgang Preiser and his disciple Karl-Heinz Ziegler.4    
The understanding of the continuity between Roman and modern international 
law is, to some extent, related to the understanding of international law itself. At one side 
of the spectrum stand the ‘minimalists’ – as Laurens Winkel recently coined them.5 These 
writers reduce the whole notion of international law – whatever its name – to the law 
governing relations between sovereign, territorial States. Consequentially, the historian of 
international law cannot reach beyond the earliest stage of the emergence of the 
sovereign State, which is now commonly set somewhere in the Late Middle Ages. 
Authors who hold this view tend to deny the very existence of anything resembling 
international law in Roman times. The argument runs that under the Roman ‘world 
empire,’ there were no independent bodies politic to sustain a system of international law. 
The ‘maximalists’ hold to a more relative view of international law. Over the 20th 
century, many international legal historians – foremost among them Paul Vinogradoff 
(1854-1925) –6 have forwarded the view that throughout history, in different times and 
                                                 
4 Wolfgang Preiser, Die Völkerrechtsgeschichte, ihre Aufgaben und ihre Methode (Frankfurt am Main 
1963); Karl-Heinz Ziegler, ‘Die römischen Grundlagen des europäischen Völkerrechts’ (1972) 4 Ius 
Commune 1; idem, Völkerrechtsgeschichte: Ein Studienbuch (Munich 1994). See also recently, Dominique 
Gaurier, Histoire du droit international. Auteurs, doctrines et développement de l’Antiquité à l’aube de la 
période contemporaine (Rennes 2005) 51. 
5 Laurens Winkel, ‘The Peace Treaties of Westphalia as an instance of the reception of Roman law’ in 
Randall Lesaffer (ed), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From  the late Middle 
Ages to World War One (Cambridge 2004) 222. 
6 Paul Vinogradoff, ‘Historical Types of International Law’ (1923) 1 Bibliotheca Visseriana 
Dissertationum Ius Internationale Illustrantium 1. 
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places, quite diverse systems, or ‘types’ of international law have existed. For these 
scholars, the recognition of a Roman international law comes easier, though this does not 
necessarily induce them to accept the argument of continuity.7 
But there is a second, very different dimension to the debate on the role of Roman 
law in the formation of international law: that of the impact of Roman private law. At 
first sight, this aspect seems far less under dispute. Is it historically well established that 
the law of nations of the Late Middle Ages fell for a large part within the domain of the 
learned jus commune, that amalgam of Roman and canon law – and some feudal law – 
studied by the scholastic jurists of the age. Less generally recognised, but hard to deny, is 
that the earliest ‘fathers’ of modern international law who started the process of making 
the law of nations into an autonomous discipline – the lawyers and theologians of the 16th 
and early 17th centuries, including Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) – largely drew on this 
medieval tradition. The concepts and notions these medieval and early-modern authors 
took from Roman law and transferred to the newly autonomous law of nations, they did 
not so much take from Roman ‘international law,’ but from Roman private law. 
Moreover, the transfer from Roman private law did not stop with Grotius. The use of 
private law principles, precepts and concepts for the formulation of the law of nations 
pertained to the very core of the Modern School of Natural Law’s intellectual 
endeavours.8 
                                                 
7 David Bederman doesn’t. See on these discussions, with reference to many examples, Grewe, Epochs of 
International Law, 7-12. 
8 Randall Lesaffer, ‘Argument from Roman Law in current international law: occupatio and acquisitive 
prescription’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 25; Karl-Heinz Ziegler, ‘The influence of 
medieval Roman law on peace treaties’ in Lesaffer (ed), Peace Treaties and International Law, 147-61. 
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The permeability between Roman private law and the medieval and early-modern 
law of nations was much eased on by the Roman concept of jus gentium, its relation to 
natural law, and the confusion this brought about in later times. For the Romans, jus 
gentium did not refer to ‘public international law,’ but was the body of private law the 
Roman courts applied to foreigners. It was at the one time ‘municipal law,’ as its rules 
were established by the Roman magistrates and courts, and ‘universal law,’ as it was 
applied to all foreigners. After the constitutio Antoniniana had bestowed Roman 
citizenship upon all free inhabitants of the Empire (212 A.D.), there was far less occasion 
than before to keep the jus gentium and the jus civile – the law applied to Roman citizens 
– apart, strengthening the mutual impact of both bodies of law. The jus gentium was a 
less strict and formalistic law than the jus civile was. It built on elements common in 
Roman and some major foreign law systems and held an important place for 
considerations of equity. The classical Roman jurists associated it closely to natural law,9 
or even reduced it to being natural law.10 Moreover, they also contributed to the later 
confusion by classifying issues pertaining to the world of international relations under jus 
gentium, making it applicable both to individuals and to bodies politic.11 
                                                 
9 Gaius, Institutes, 1.1: ‘(…) while the law that natural reason establishes among all mankind is followed 
by all people alike, and is called jus gentium’ (transl. Laurens Winkel, ‘Peace Treaties of Westphalia’ 225; 
my emphasis). 
10 Ulpian in D. 1.1.1.4. 
11 Hermogenianus in D. 1.1.5.  Isidorus of Sevilla (c. 560-636)  reduced it completely to matters of 
international relations,  Etymologiae 5.6, and thus paved the way for the medieval understanding of jus 
gentium as ‘public international law.’ See on all this, Winkel, ‘The Peace Treaties of Westphalia’ 225-6.  
 6 
The historical contribution of Roman private law to the formation of modern 
international law is hard to contest. But whether it is to be appreciated or not, is an 
entirely different matter. Here we touch upon the debate about private law analogies in 
current international law. In his doctoral thesis, published in 1927, Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht (1897-1960), later Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge 
(1937-1956) and Judge in the International Court of Justice (1956-1960), underscored the 
importance of the use of concepts and institutes of municipal private law in international 
law, both historically and currently.12 While in recent times, the analogies had been made 
from precepts and concepts common to the major municipal law systems of the world, in 
earlier times – meaning chiefly, before the great codifications of the 19th century – , they 
had been taken from Roman law. Lauterpacht strongly defended and promoted the 
practice. It became one of the cornerstones of his system of international law. Reference 
to private law, which he considered to be a more developed system than international 
law, ensured the completeness and progressive articulation of international law. 
                                                 
12 In the years immediately preceding Lauterpacht’s book on private and international law, different other 
international lawyers also addressed the subject, e.g. Paul Ruegger, ‘Privatrechtliche Begriffe im 
Völkerrecht. Studie zur Interpretation des internationalen Rechts’ (1920) 18 Niemeyers Zeitschrift für 
Internationales Recht 425; Gordon Sherman, ‘Jus Gentium and International Law’ (1918) 12 American 
Journal of International Law 56; idem, ‘The nature and sources of international law’ (1921) 15 American 
Journal of International Law 349; Heinrich Triepel, ‘Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit 
international’ (1925) 1 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 73. In his two articles, 
Sherman took great pain to explain the original meaning of Roman jus gentium as universal private law, as 
if it were a novel thing for the readers of the American Journal to learn. See on this David Kennedy, 
‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an illusion’ (1997) 17 Quinnipiac Law Review 
100, 126. 
 7 
Lauterpacht realised his position to be contentious. It was in strong opposition to the 
positivist creed on international law. The use of private law rules for the regulation of 
international conflict went against two major tenets from the positivist approach to 
international law. First, it went against voluntarism and consensualism in international 
law, the claim that States are only subject to rules they have voluntary consented to. In 
this view, treaties and customs form the sole sources of international law. Second, using 
private law analogies or transplants implies the rejection of the self-sufficiency of 
international law, in particular its autonomy and fundamental distinctiveness from private 
law. The claim to self-sufficiency is consequential to the conception of the State as an 
autonomous moral being, fundamentally different from individual man and not subject to 
the same moral rules and laws. In his book, Lauterpacht included a brief survey of the 
position of some major writers of international law, starting with Albericus Gentilis 
(1552-1608). Herein, he tried to prove that even those authors who had striven to deny 
the impact of Roman or private law, or rejected its further use, had in reality not escaped 
its use.13 
The historical debate on the interaction between Roman and international law in 
its two dimension stands not aloof from international lawyers’ debates about the essence 
of international law. The positivist defenders of modern international law as a system 
regulating relations between sovereign States – as a truly autonomous public international 
law – tend to reject the historical, let alone the contemporary significance of Roman law. 
                                                 
13 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (With Special Reference to 
International Arbitration) (London 1927); a revised version of Lauterpacht’s historical survey in Elihu 
Lauterpacht (ed), International Law Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. 2 (Cambridge 
1975) 173-212. See also Lesaffer, ‘Argument from Roman law’ 27-38. 
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The reduction of the very concept of international law to international law as it was 
constructed within the context of the European States system, leads to minimising the 
continuity between Roman and later times and has even led to rejecting the very 
existence of a Roman international law. Voluntarism and the claims of moral sovereignty 
made for the modern States have induced students of international law, and its history, to 
neglect the historical contribution Roman private law made to the formation of modern 
international law. 
In the debate on Roman law and international law, the name of Lauterpacht looms 
the largest among international lawyers since the early 20th century. Modern historians of 
international law mostly refer to their great German predecessors of the 20th century, 
particularly Grewe and Preiser. But how did the earlier historians of international law of 
the 19th century look upon the problem? How did these writers, who were living either in 
a day when the positivist conception was still on the rise or was dominant, approach the 
subject? In this article, we will analyse the views of four Anglo-American writers who, 
between 1795 and 1899, each wrote a monograph on the history of international law. We 
will try to relate their historical interpretation to their understanding of international law 
itself. These four pioneers of the history of international law are Robert Ward, Henry 
Wheaton, John Hosack and Thomas Alfred Walker.14  
                                                 
14 The discussion is limited to the writers of historical monographs, excluding the sometimes elaborate 
historical introductions to textbooks on international law, such as that of Sir Robert Phillimore (1810-
1885). In the preface to the first edition of his Commentaries upon International Law, Phillimore gave a 
sketch of the history of international legal doctrine and of international law in England and Britain (i-li). In 
it, he particularly stressed the significance of civil law in England and Britain, also in the field of 
 9 
It has to be remarked that for the lawyers of the common law countries, 
particularly those from Britain, of the 19th century the connection between the civil and 
international law came much more naturally than to their 20th-century successors or their 
continental counterparts. Since the establishment of the Regius Chairs of Civil Law at the 
universities of Cambridge and Oxford in the 16th century, graduates from these law 
schools, who have read in the civil law, have often counselled in matters of international 
law and relations, and this certainly not only in the context of the Court of Admiralty. Up 
to second half of the 19th century, international law as an academic field was to a large 
extent the province of those civilians. Of the authors studied here, Ward and Walker who 
read at Oxford and Cambridge were exposed to the civil law as students.15  
 
 
2. Robert Ward (1795) 
 
Robert Ward (1765-1846), or Robert Plumer Ward as he styled himself upon his second 
marriage (1828), was a conservative politician, who later in his life won some fame as a 
writer of didactic and theologically inspired novels. Ward was admitted to Christ Church 
                                                                                                                                                 
international law and relations, during the Early Modern Age. His main concern was to indicate that the gap 
between the English and continental legal cultures must not be overestimated. 4 vols. (London 1854-1861). 
15 James Crawford, ‘Public International Law in Twentieth-century England’ in Jack Beatson and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Emigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century England 
(Oxford 2004) 685-92; Michael Lobban, ‘English approaches to international law in the nineteenth century’ 
in Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and International Law 
(Leyden/Boston 2007) 66-70. 
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College in Oxford, where he read the classics (1783-1787), and was called to the bar by 
Inner Temple in 1790. He was a protégé of the younger William Pitt (1759-1806), thanks 
to whom he was elected to the House of Commons (1802). From 1807 to 1823, Ward 
actively served in government, among others as a junior Lord on the Board of Admiralty 
(1807-1811, under his brother-in-law Henry Phipps, Lord Mulgrave, 1755-1831) and at 
the Board of the Ordnance (1811-1823, again under Mulgrave and from 1819 under 
Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, 1769-1852).16 It was at the instigation of another 
conservative leader, John Scott, Lord Eldon (1751-1838) that Ward, then a young 
barrister, took it upon him to write on the law of nations.17 The political agenda behind 
this suggestion was to defend Britain’s traditional understanding of the law of nations and 
fly it in the face of the revolutionaries of the French ‘Convention.’ Within the year from 
this suggestion, the young Ward published his two-volume Enquiry into the Foundation 
and History of the Law of Nations in Europe.18 
 Later, Ward would go on to publish on aspects of the law of nations, often 
induced so by current policy issues. So it was at the suggestion of the Foreign Secretary, 
                                                 
16 For Ward’s life, works and thought, see: Diego Panizza, Genesi di una ideologia. Il conservatismo 
moderno in Robert Ward (Milan 1997); P.G. Patmore, My Friends and Acquaintances: Memorials of 
deceased celebrities, vol. 2 (London 1854) 1-202; Edmund Phipps, Memoirs of the Political and Literary 
Life of Robert Plumer Ward, with selections from his correspondence, diaries and unpublished literary 
remains, 2 vols. (London 1850); Clive Towse, ‘Ward, Robert Plumer’ in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, vol. 57 (Oxford 2004) 341-2. On Ward as a novelist: Matthew W. Rosa, The Silver-Fork 
School: Novels of fashion preceding Vanity Fair (New York 1936) 63-8. 
17 Phipps, Memoirs, vol. 1, 11-15. 
18 Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe, from the 
Greeks and the Romans to the Age of Grotius, 2 vols. (Dublin 1795, repr. Clark, N.J. 2005). 
 11 
William, Lord Grenville (1759-1834), that Ward in 1801 applied himself to the maritime 
laws of warfare in order to promote Britain’s position in its conflicts with the neutral 
powers of Northern Europe.19 In 1805, Ward published a book on the commencement of 
war in history to support the Pitt government’s stance that the British navy’s action of 
1804 against four Spanish frigates before war was declared was in accordance with 
international legal practice.20 
 Ward’s history of the law of nations of 1795 has to be situated within the context 
of the emergence of a coalition of conservative forces in British politics and of the early 
articulation of a conservative political ideology in reaction to the radicalisation of the 
French Revolution from 1792 onwards.21 Ward, who had been in France during the 
earlier stages of the Revolution and had found himself lucky to depart in time (1790), 
clearly adhered to this conservative reaction. 
 In the Preface to this work, Ward commenced by explaining that he first 
envisioned writing a ‘Treatise of Diplomatic Law,’ but that, after he had assembled all 
necessary materials, he had stumbled on the fundamental question of the basis of 
                                                 
19 Robert Ward, A Treatise on the Relative Rights and Duties of Belligerent and Neutral Powers in 
Maritime Affairs: In which the principles of armed neutralities and the opinions of Hubner and Schlegel 
are fully discussed (London 1801) and idem, An Essay on Contraband: Being a continuation of the Treatise 
of the Relative Rights and Duties of Belligerent and Neutral Nations, in maritime affairs (London 1801). 
20 Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Manner in which Different Wars in Europe have been commenced 
during the last two centuries (London 1805), which was read by Pitt before it was published and dedicated 
to Lord Eldon. 
21 Panizza, Genesi di una ideologia, 5-15. 
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obligation and looked for answers in the existing treatises. There, so he went on, he had 
found himself: 
  
 (…) referred to the Law of Nature for the real and original source of all the 
obligation in men to obey the Law of Nations; and this Law of Nature again, I 
was told to look for in my own heart and natural conscience, which were to decide 
for me and all the world in the same manner, in almost all cases.22 
 
Ward did not reject the existence of natural law, nor that it formed part of the foundation 
of the law of nations. But he rejected another central tenet of Enlightenment natural 
jurisprudence, namely that it was feasible through the sole process of abstract reasoning 
to articulate a body of law, such as the law of nations. Natural law or reason could not be 
the sole basis of obligation of the law of nation.23 That lay in the ‘authority and precepts 
of a religion.’ As there existed ‘varieties of religion and moral systems … operated upon 
also by important local circumstances,’24 so there also existed ‘different Law of Nations 
for different parts of the globe.’ And as religions and systems of morality changed 
through time, so also did the law of nations. ‘All this, Ward concluded, was to be proved 
                                                 
22 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, ii. 
23 Casper Sylvest, ‘International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain’ (2004) 75 British Yearbook of 
International Law 25. 
24 Ward referred in this context to Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois 19 (Geneva 
1748), see Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 79. 
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from history.’25 For Ward, it was self-evident that the European law of nations, based on 
revealed, Christian religion, was the true law of nations. This came only to be developed 
by the days of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). 
 Ward’s work entered into the fold of the emergent conservative reaction to 
Enlightenment and Revolution. He rejected the possibility of articulating law solely 
through natural reason and denied the possibility of a universal and immutable law of 
nations. The law of nations had to be found in the study of practice – of historical and 
current reality – and tradition and was ultimately based on religion and morality. The 
whole idea of revolutionary renewal was thereby implicitly rebutted. 
 The Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations fell into two 
parts. The first part (vol. 1, 1-102) served to refute the claims of natural, universal 
jurisprudence and expound Ward’s ideas on the relativity of the law of nations and its 
foundation in religion and morality. The much larger, second part (vol. 1, 103-236 and 
vol. 2, 1-379) offered a chronological survey of the development of the law of nations 
starting with the ancient Greeks and Romans and leading up to Grotius. It served as 
empirical evidence of Ward’s ideas about the law of nations. Robert Ward considered the 
Dutch humanist to be ‘the great father of the science,’ having given ‘to the world a 
Treatise which has stood the test of time.’26 Only with Grotius did the law of nations 
become a true discipline. Later writings, such as those of Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) 
                                                 
25 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, ii-iv. In stressing the 
inextricable bond between natural law and the Christian religion, Ward stuck close to the views expressed 
by William Blackstone (1723-1780) in the Introduction to his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
Oxford 1765, vol. 1, 38-43. 
26 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 370. 
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and Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) had only served a purpose because of the defective 
method of Grotius, who had neglected to first lay down the elementary principles before 
plunging into particular rules and practical matters. Here, as at other places, Ward 
showed to consider legal science in terms of a system of general principles and their 
concrete applications, which was central to natural law and enlightened thinking. The 
whole second part traced and explained the slow and gradual growth of the law of nations 
towards the Grotian moment, under the impact of changing morals, religion and practical 
circumstances. Ward focused on diplomatic and legal practice and had little regard for 
doctrinal developments. 
 Of the ancients, only the Greeks and the Romans were deemed worthy of any 
attention. They both had laws of nations, but these were lacking in humanity – or 
‘politeness’ as he called it – as both the Greeks and Romans departed from the idea of 
natural enmity between the peoples of the world. Ward indicated that the Greeks and the 
Romans used the same word for ‘foreigner’ as for ‘enemy.’ He also quoted the 
maltreatment of the Persian King Darius’s (522-486 B.C.) ambassadors by the Greeks 
and the condoning of piracy. In general, the Romans were more generous to foreign 
peoples than the Greeks, whose malpractice Ward at one time compared with the actions 
of the French Convention.27 Ward stipulated that the Romans did not allow their citizens 
to fight but under the authority of the State; if not they might be considered robbers. He 
likened this to ‘the modern notions.’28 The laws of war condoned a lot of cruelty, which 
                                                 
27 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 110-11. 
28 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 112. 
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Ward attributed to the ‘want of a milder religion.’29 He deplored the Machiavellism of the 
Romans who pursued ‘their own great object, of dominion, by every mode, generous or 
subtile.’30 On the other hand, it had to be admitted that the Roman writers on the law of 
nations often deplored this themselves and also that the Romans proved quite humane in 
the treatment of conquered people. But all in all, the Greeks and Romans had attained ‘all 
the unassisted genius of Humanity could attain to,’ because, so Ward went on: 
 
 One thing however was wanting to the perfection which, had they possessed it, 
they would probably have acquired: and that was, knowledge of the doctrines of a 
Religion, which whatever may be its points of controversy, has had the uniform 
effect, wher-ever it has taken root, of producing a more equitable notion of things, 
and a milder system of manners.31 
 
All this makes clear that, opposed though he may be to the Enlightenment, Ward did not 
shake one of its central ideas: the idea of progress and civilisation itself. But his 
explanation of this process was both historical and religious. For him, progress was not 
attained through the emancipation of free thought, but through divine revelation and 
                                                 
29 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 113. 
30 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 115. 
31 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 103. Also see: ‘These 
Codes, however, were composed under whatever influence the precepts of the religions of the countries, 
such as they were, could be supposed to have; and it would have been better for the world if the 
concurrence of so many religions, in the praise of whose toleration Mr. Gibbon has been so copious, could 
have produced a better effect upon the codes of the Law of Nations then in existence,’ vol. 2, 6. 
 16 
man’s slow acceptance and understanding of it. The Greek and Roman civilisation, 
despite its high standing, could not develop any further than it did and could not attain 
anything near moral perfection because of its ‘want of religion.’ 
 The future politician also shed light on the role of medieval Roman jurisprudence 
in the formation of the law of nations. He accepted this as a historical fact, but led a harsh 
attack against it. He did so on two different issues. 
 First, Ward took offence against the medieval notion of the Emperor – that is of 
the Holy Roman Empire – as dominus mundi, as lord of all the world. Ward thought this 
misconception of the power of the Emperor, who was after all only the ruler of Germany 
and Italy, if that, to be based on the combination of the use of the imperial title of 
Charlemagne (768-814) with his possession of a much larger portion of the old Western 
Roman Empire. Ward reproached the ‘civilians,’ the medieval students of Roman law, 
for this ‘jumble.’32 
 A more direct denunciation of Roman law’s influence on the law of nations came 
in the context of his discussion of a cause célèbre of English diplomatic history: the 
prosecution of John Leslie, Bishop of Ross (1527-1596), Mary Queen of Scots’ (1543-
1587) ambassador to England during the time of her captivity in that country, on the 
accusation of having conspired against Queen Elisabeth (1558-1603). In this context, 
advice was sought from a commission of foreign and of English civil lawyers. The 
English lawyers in their answer restricted the immunity from criminal prosecution of 
ambassadors, an opinion that was shortly to be overruled. Also, the issue 
                                                 
32 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 239, naming also Bartolus 
of Sassoferrato (1314-1357), vol. 1, 46 and vol. 2, 242-3 – there also taking down Ulpian (d. 212) with him. 
 17 
 
 (…) was, however, warmly contested in Europe, and for a long time divided the 
Civilians, who, as we shall have occasion to point out in another Chapter, had not 
yet fallen upon the true method of coming at the Law of Nations. In truth they had 
not yet shaken off the trammels of the Roman law, and numberless difficulties 
were therefore started from the Digest, concerning the word Legatus, the only one 
known in Latin for Ambassador. For they did not recollect immediately, that it 
admitted of two interpretations, namely, an Ambassador from one independent 
State to another; and a Deputy from a dependant province to the Court of Rome.33 
 
At once, this provided a fine example of how the perception of Roman civil law as a 
timeless embodiment of ratio scripta and the a-historical interpretation this led too, could 
be misleading and lead away from the true principles of the law of nations. 
According to Ward, the law of nations came only into itself, once – among other 
things – the Roman civil law had been shaken off. He reproached the predecessors of 
Grotius to have,  
 
 (…) intrenched themselves behind the civil law of the Romans, from which they 
never suffered themselves to wander. As if Ulpian and Papinian had been 
infallible, and had been sent down from Heaven to prescribe laws for all the 
                                                 
33 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 312, see also 357 where he 
refers to the humanist jurist François Hotman (1524-1590) and complains about taking ‘the arguments … 
from the civil law of the Romans, the inefficacy of which we shall presently have occasion to discuss.’ 
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world; or as if its various nations were always to find a certain rule of conduct for 
their intercourse with one another as independent States, in laws made for one 
integral community, which had long been totally dissipated that few vestiges of its 
original people remained. Notwithstanding this, however the greatest public 
lawyers from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, adjudged all controversies 
between nations by the rules of this celebrated law; and the errors of Accursius 
and Bartolus which might be excused by the ‘Temporum suorum infelicitas,’ 
were followed on the same authority, by the two famous Spanish Civilians, 
Covarruvias and Vasques, in the very age of Grotius.34 
 
This quotation in particular lays bare Ward’s reasons for his harsh rejection of the use of 
Roman law in the articulation of the law of nations. It is not so much as a staunch 
positivist – which he was not as he accepted a role for natural law as a foundation for the 
law of nations – that Ward took offence at the civilians’ influence. Ward rejected the idea 
that the law of nations could be gleaned by natural reason from the law of nature, and he 
opposed Pufendorf’s and other writers’ identification of natural law and the law of 
nations. In this context, he also expressly denounced the classical Roman lawyers’ 
association of the jus gentium with jus naturale, thereby making reference to Gaius 1.1.1 
and D. 1.1.9 and 41.1.1.35 As such, it was logical for him also to refuse the notion of 
Roman law as the embodiment of ratio scripta because of its association in his day and 
                                                 
34 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 366. Diego Covarruvias 
(1512-1577) and Fernando Vasquez de Menchaca (1512-1569) were both civil and canon lawyers. 
35 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 3-5. 
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age with natural law and natural jurisprudence. In doing so, he broke down what was the 
Modern School of Natural Law’s bridge between civil law and the law of nations. 
 
 
3. Henry Wheaton (1845) 
 
Upon graduation from Rhode Island College – now Brown University – in 1802, Henry 
Wheaton (1785-1848) spent some years in France. Even as a student, Wheaton had been 
fascinated by the French Revolution, to the point of him being nicknamed ‘Citizen 
Wheaton’ by his fellow students. In 1805 while in France, the young lawyer from 
Providence translated the entire Code Civil of 1804 to English, but his manuscript was 
lost. Back in Rhode Island in 1806, he was admitted to the State’s bar. In 1811, he moved 
to New York where he became a journalist for the National Advocate. During his years as 
a journalist, Wheaton often came out in support of President James Madison’s (1809-
1817) foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Anglo-American War (1812-1814). In 
1815, upon admission to the New York bar, Wheaton was appointed Chief Justice of the 
New York Maritime Court, a post he held until 1819. In 1816, he was appointed reporter 
with the United States Supreme Court. During the next twelve years, Wheaton would edit 
twelve volumes of Court reports. Many of the cases he reported involved international 
and transnational disputes such as trade and maritime cases, for which reference was 
made to the law of nations, applicable both the States as well as individuals. During that 
period, he also served as a member of the constitutional convention for the State of New 
York (1821) and as a reviser of the State’s laws (1825-1827).  
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In 1827, Wheaton moved to a new career as he accepted to become the United 
States’ chargé d’affaires in Denmark. While travelling to Copenhagen, Wheaton stopped 
at London where he got to know Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). In 1835, Wheaton was 
promoted to become the U.S. representative with the King of Prussia in Berlin. He stayed 
there until 1847. When it became clear at that time that the incoming administration 
would not grant his life’s wish to become ambassador in Paris or London, Wheaton 
resigned and returned home.36 
As a journalist, a legal practitioner and a diplomat, Wheaton was extensively 
exposed to international law, particularly relating to matters of trade and maritime 
warfare. In 1836, Wheaton published his major treatise on international law, Elements of 
International Law, which opened with a brief survey of the history of international law 
from the Greeks to the 18th century (1-29).37 In 1845, followed Wheaton’s great 
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10.2 (New York 1964) 39-42; Elisabeth Feaster Baker, Henry Wheaton 1785-1848 (Philadelphia 1937); 
Joyce Craig, ‘Henry Wheaton’ in American National Biography, vol. 23 (Oxford/New York 1999) 123-5; 
Edward Everett, ‘Life, Services and Works of Henry Wheaton’ (1856) 82 North American Review 1; 
Frederick C. Hicks, ‘Henry Wheaton’ in Men and Books Famous in the Law (New York 1921) 190-235; 
William Vail Kellen, Henry Wheaton, An appreciation, being the address before the alumni on the 
occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of his graduation, June seventeenth, MDCCCIII (Boston 1902); 
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37 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law with a Sketch of the History of the Science (London and 
Philadelphia 1836). The historical introduction or ‘sketch’ was based on a paper Wheaton had presented in 
1820 to the New York Historical Society. George Grafton Wilson, ‘Henry Wheaton and International Law’ 
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monograph on international legal history, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and 
America, from the Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842.38 The book had first 
been written in French as Wheaton’s submission to the Institut de France’s Academy of 
Moral and Political Sciences’ prize for the best essay on the question, Quels sont les 
progrès qu’a fait le droit des gens en Europe depuis la Paix de Westphalie in 1841.39 The 
New York edition of 1845 was more than a translation. It was a much-extended version 
covering more recent developments, adding details on affairs involving the Ottoman 
Empire, the Middle East and the United States. Wheaton also greatly expanded the 
introductory chapter on the period before Westphalia.40 
Wheaton was above all a practitioner of international law – or better, of the law of 
nations –, which showed in his writings. His views on the foundations of international 
law can be gleaned, albeit with difficulty, from the first chapter of his Elements of 
International Law, as well as from his comments on the classics of international law in 
his historical sketch and monograph. Between the first two editions of his treatise in 1836 
and the third edition in 1846,41 Wheaton moved somewhat through the spectrum of the 
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debate between positivists and naturalists to the former side.42 But such a shift in 
theoretical perspective did not induce Wheaton thoroughly to revise the rest of the book. 
It did, among other things, not lead the American diplomat to amend his definition of 
international law – which he took from James Madison –43 or his theory on the sources of 
international law. There was no need. His move towards the positivist side of the 
spectrum brought the theoretical outlines he defended at the inception of his book more in 
line with his general understanding of international law as it appeared from the whole 
treatise. From its first appearance, The Elements had been the work of a practitioner 
writing for practitioners. 
Modern historians of international law have classified Wheaton as a moderate in 
the debate between the positivists and naturalists of his day.44 It may be more accurate to 
label him a very reluctant Austinian – in the sense that he acknowledged Austin’s main 
point only then to try to wriggle away from it – to the point of being an anti-Austinian. 
Wheaton referred to John Austin’s concept of law as command.45 As such, the law of 
nations – a term Wheaton clenched to until he exchanged it for Bentham’s ‘international 
law’ in the third edition of his Elements – was not ‘proper law’ in Austin’s view46 On this 
                                                 
42 Wilson, ‘Wheaton and International Law’ 14. 
43 James Madison, Examination of the British Doctrine, which subjects to capture a neutral trade not open 
in Time of Peace (London 1806) 41; Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 54. 
44 Grewe, Epochs of International Law, 508. 
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point, Wheaton, in his History of the Law of Nations, applauded Pufendorf for 
recognising that there was 
 
(…) no other sort of law of nations, voluntary or positive, at least which has the 
force of law properly so called, binding upon nations as emanating from a 
superior. In using this qualification of the term law properly so called as 
emanating from a superior, Pufendorf seems to show that he had caught a glimpse 
of the truth. 47 
 
But that indeed it was to Wheaton, ‘a glimpse of the truth.’ As to Austin, to Wheaton the 
law of nations was morally binding and was enforceable through moral sanction, or by  
 
(…) fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking 
general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they should violate 
maxims generally received and respected.48 
 
Wheaton may not have refuted and even have adopted Austin’s definition of law as 
command, but he was clearly not at ease with denying the legal character of international 
obligation or too prepared to attach much consequence to it. For Wheaton it mattered 
little whether the law of nations was called ‘proper law’ or not, what mattered was that it 
was real. From his experience as a legal practitioner and a diplomat, he had learned that 
                                                 
47 Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, 93. 
48 Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, 94, quoting from Austin, Province, 171. 
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States and States’ organs such as courts – and in particular, the United States Supreme 
Court – did take the law of nations seriously, considered it binding and, very often, 
applied it. As such, Wheaton attached great significance to Austin’s qualification that – 
though not a legal obligation –, States could not disregard their duties under the law of 
nations without ‘provoking general hostility and incurring its probable evils;’ therefore, 
the laws of nations were called ‘laws by analogy’. Observance of international law might 
not be enforceable the same way municipal law was, but it was dictated by ‘international 
morality.’ ‘The history of the progress of the science of international jurisprudence’ 
proved that this observance was real.49 To Wheaton, the reality of international law as a 
determinant of States’ behaviour clearly mattered more than its qualification as either law 
or morality. In other words, its moral character as well as its application by States in their 
mutual relations, counted for a lot with Wheaton.50  
Furthermore, in his third edition of The Elements of International Law, Wheaton 
was certainly eager to accept the great Berlin civil lawyer Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s 
(1779-1861) definition of the law of nations as an ‘imperfect positive law,’ but still a law. 
 
International law may therefore be considered as a positive law, but as an 
imperfect positive law, (eine unvollendete Rechtsbildung), both on account of the 
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indeterminateness of its precepts, and because it lacks that solid base on which 
rests the positive law of every particular nation.51 
 
In this later edition of his work, Wheaton also left out the references to Austin’s 
definition of law.  
 In line with Austin, or Bentham for that matter, Wheaton could not agree to 
reduce the law of nations to a mere deduction from natural law. But neither did he accept 
its mere reduction to the conventions, usages or other positive enactments of the nations. 
Wheaton upbraided the 18th- century positivist Johann Jakob Moser (1701-1785) for  
 
(…) reducing [the law of nations] merely to the positive rules to be collected from 
the practice of nations, laying entirely out of view of those general principles of 
justice which have commonly been referred to, as constituting its basis, under the 
name of natural law.52 
 
Wheaton held to a middle position between positivists and naturalists. The law of nations 
had to be looked for in the positive acts of nations – the sources of that law – but, for 
Wheaton, its ultimate foundation remained the law of nature. Wheaton took his definition 
of international law and his theory of the sources of international law from James 
Madison.53 While international law was articulated in the positive enactments of States, it 
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was ultimately based on natural law. However, Wheaton did not elaborate on the 
significance this foundation in natural law had for the law of nations. Wheaton held that 
‘international law is commonly divided into two branches:’ the natural and the positive 
law of nations.54 At some point, he based a general principle, such as the equality of 
states, on natural law.55 But natural law did not have much impact in his conception of 
international law once it came to defining the sources and the material rules of 
international law. For him, ‘natural law’ referred to some general principles of justice 
that, through the ages, had found their way into great legal systems, including the law of 
nations. Above all, natural law seemed to be an inheritance Wheaton took on board from 
Madison, whose primary concern it had been to find a basis of objective justice to oppose 
the British ‘exercise of preponderant power’ as a ‘justification’ for their policy regarding 
neutral shipping during the Napoleonic Wars. It was there to give the law of nations a 
strong basis in justice and human progress, but not to dictate much of what the law of 
nations actually said. There was no need to elaborate on what natural law itself said.56 To 
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Wheaton, natural law primarily served to make the positive law of nations binding and to 
limit the free arbiter of States through the means of some notion of objective justice. All 
in all, natural law did not seem to sit easy in Wheaton’s system. 
There was, however, yet another dimension to Wheaton’s genuflexion to natural 
law To Wheaton, international law was an autonomous body of public law not to be 
equated with natural jurisprudence or universal private law. Nevertheless, it did not 
exclusively apply to States. In the common law courts of the early 19th century such as 
the US Supreme Court, the ‘law of nations’ was not yet seen as solely applicable to States 
in their mutual relations to the exclusion of private citizens, but was regularly applied to 
what we would call today ‘transnational’ cases directly involving private citizens, such as 
trade or maritime disputes. In practice, this ‘law of nations’ consisted of an amalgam of 
customary law, treaty law as well as precepts and rules of canon and Roman law. Writing 
in 1836, Wheaton seemed to be relating to Jeremy Bentham’s theory of the State acting 
under the same moral precept of utility as the individual.57 The equation of the State’s 
and the individual’s moral duty certainly held an appeal to Wheaton and helps explain 
why he felt he needed natural law as the basis of the law of nations. However, in the later 
editions of the Elements, Wheaton embraced the solution the Berlin professor of 
international law August Wilhelm Heffter’s (1796-1880) offered. Heffter defended the 
position that the – positive – law of nations, based upon general usage and tacit consent 
of nations, did not only apply to States but also to individuals as far as they were 
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concerned by it. This referred to ‘human rights in general, and those private relations, 
which sovereign States recognize in respect to individuals not subject to their 
authority.’58 Again, this change in the doctrinal outline at the beginning of his book did 
not have much impact felt in the rest of the book because it fitted. It nicely explained why 
‘international law’ was also directly applicable to private persons, without having to give 
too much allowance to natural law and jeopardize international law’s autonomy as a 
system of public law all too much. In his later edition, Wheaton stuck to Madison’s 
definition of the law of nations, but did not follow it up any longer with the comment that 
there existed both a natural and a positive law of nations. 
Wheaton clearly rejected the existence of a universal or immutable law of nations. 
He agreed with Ward, whom he referred to, that there was ‘only a particular law of 
nations, applicable to a distinct set or family of nations, varying at different times with 
the change in religion, manners, government, and other institutions among every class of 
nations.’59 The system Wheaton proposed to study was that of ‘the civilized and Christian 
people of Europe or to those of European origin.’60 While Wheaton was in perfect 
agreement here with Ward, he did not feel the need so staunchly to detract from the 
naturalist’s position as Ward had. For Wheaton, the particularity of the law of nations 
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was self-evident from the fact that the positive acts, the conventions and usages, of 
nations constituted the law of nations and that these could only be uniform ‘among 
nations of the same class or family, united by the ties of similar origin, manners, and 
religion.’61 This did not seem to need further proof or qualification. 
Of the 67 pages he devoted to the pre-Westphalian law of nations, Wheaton spent 
half (1-33) to the ancient Greeks en Romans. He shared Ward’s judgment that their laws, 
particularly the laws of war, were harsh. He mentioned the natural enmity, slavery and 
piracy and the cruel treatment of prisoners of war.62 He upbraided the ancients for putting 
public interest above everything else, but was inclined towards ‘a charitable indulgence 
for the imperfections of a lower stage of civilization.’63 As with Ward, Wheaton’s 
perception of the law of nations of the ancients was coloured by the enlightened ideas of 
progress and civilisation. 
Wheaton addressed the question whether the ancients knew the doctrine of the 
balance of power, a question raised by David Hume (1711-1776).64 He acknowledged 
that they knew of the principle – Polybios (c. 200-120 B.C.) attests to that –,65 but that the 
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Greeks had failed to apply it successfully in order to avert universal monarchy.66 These 
comments about the balance of power, as those on the amphyctionic leagues show 
Wheaton to concede that the ancient law of nations already had some of the precepts and 
institutions of the modern law in it, but that it was greatly underdeveloped. Again, he was 
much less passionate in making the latter point than Ward was, but the superiority of 
modern civilisation was clearly upheld.67 
Wheaton opened his analysis of the Roman contribution by referring to Marcus 
Tullius Cicero’s (106-43 B.C.) ‘more liberal’ theory of natural justice among all 
mankind.68 He also acknowledged Cicero’s musings on the Roman jus fetiale, the archaic 
body of religious law that applied to many aspects of external relations such as the 
declaration of war and the making of treaties. But in reality, Roman practice during war 
was much more brutal than Cicero held, and it became even more so with the decline of 
the Republic. Wheaton upbraided the Romans for having ‘pursued a scheme of 
aggrandizement, conceived in deep policy, and prosecuted with inflexible pride and 
pertinacity’ in what was an ‘eternal war.’69 The jus fetiale 
 
(…) was merely intended to give regular sanction to the practice of war, and 
contributed but little to mitigate its enormities. The precepts of this code are 
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strongly contrasted with the oppressive conduct of the Romans towards their 
allies, and their unjust and cruel treatment of their vanquished enemies.70 
 
The Roman version of the law of nations, the jus fetiale, might have had something to say 
for it, but it was hardly effective in lessening the hardships Rome inflicted upon its 
enemies. 
 Wheaton went on to inform his readership that ‘no professed treatise of 
international has been left us by any ancient writer.’71 There was, thus, no science of 
international law. Furthermore, jus fetiale was not truly international law as it was from 
Roman origin and as it was not based on reciprocity.72 
 
It was in itself only a civil law of their own; they called it a law of nations, 
because the design of it was to direct them how they should conduct themselves 
towards other nations in the hostile intercourse of war, and not because all other 
nations were obliged to observe it.73 
 
The term jus gentium was used to indicate something wholly different from the modern 
notion of law of nations. 
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(…) the idea associated with this term was not that of a positive rule governing 
the intercourse between independent communities, but what has been since called 
the law of nature, or the rule of conduct that is observed, or ought to be observed 
by all mankind independent of positive institution and of compact.74 
 
Making due allowances to Von Savigny,75 Wheaton explained the double source of the 
Roman jus gentium. On the one side, the Romans conceived of it as the law common to 
all nations. But because it was impossible to establish it so, the Roman jurists accepted 
natural reason to be at its origin. So logically, Roman jurists started to identify the jus 
gentium with the jus naturale. Through the process of being applied side-by-side in the 
Roman courts, the jus gentium and the jus civile were increasingly assimilating in regards 
to their contents.  As the Empire expanded, the jus gentium became more significant and 
was used to supplement the jus civile where the latter proved unsatisfactory.76 
 Having thus introduced the growing association of natural law, law of nations and 
civil law, Wheaton moved to the greatest contribution the Romans made to the modern 
law of nations: that of Roman private law. 
 
Though the Romans had a very imperfect knowledge of international morality as 
a science, and too little regard for it as a practical rule of conduct between states, 
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yet their national jurisprudence contributed to furnish the materials for 
constructing the new edifice of public law in modern Europe.77 
 
It was the Roman aristocracy – the most accomplished of all aristocracies in moral 
character thanks to Stoic philosophy –78 that brought the Roman civil law to its great 
heights. As Von Savigny had attested, the Roman civil law survived through the Dark 
Middle Ages and never wholly disappeared. Following faithfully in the footsteps of Von 
Savigny, Wheaton explained that the vanquished Romans had not been completely 
exterminated or de-possessed by the conquering Goths – as opposed to the older 
historical telling – and that they had kept their personal law and municipal constitutions. 
Charlemagne’s conquest of the larger part of the old Western Empire had allowed for the 
Roman law once again to become ‘the common law of those continental countries which 
were formerly Roman provinces,’ and some other lands to the north and east of that, 
particularly, Germany.79 
  
On the revival of the study of the civil law, which as we have already seen had 
become more and more merged in the jus gentium, it became identified with the 
jus gentium in the modern sense of that term as synonymous with international 
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law. The professors of the famous school of Bologna were not only civilians, but 
were employed in public offices, and especially in diplomatic missions and as 
arbiters in the disputes between the different states of Italy.80 
 
Wheaton then referred to the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190) seeking advice 
from the civilians from Bologna in his dispute with the Italian municipalities (Roncaglia, 
1158), which Wheaton interpreted as evidence of ‘the growing influence and authority of 
the civilians as the interpreters of the only science of universal jurisprudence then 
known.’81 
 
From this period the cultivation of the science of the jus gentium was considered 
as the peculiar office of the civilians throughout Europe, even in those countries 
which had only partially adopted the Roman jurisprudence as the basis of their 
own municipal law. The authority of the Roman jurisconsults was constantly 
invoked in all international questions, and was not unfrequently misapplied as if 
their decisions constituted laws of universal obligation.82 
 
Also some of the early-modern writers of the law of nations such as Gentilis and one of 
his successors in the Regius Chair of Civil Law at Oxford, Richard Zouche (1590-1660), 
continued to refer to the Roman civil law. Wheaton also mentioned the faulty 
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interpretation of the Roman term legatus. He briefly indicated that the Roman law found 
its way to the classical canon law. He pointed to the role theologians such as Francisco de 
Vitoria (c. 1480-1546) and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) would play in the formation of 
the modern law of nations, who inspired by their Christianity, contributed to the justice 
and humanisation of the law of nations.83 
 From his further, often elaborate comments on the early-modern classics of the 
law of nations from the 16th to the 18th century, we can surmise that Wheaton judged the 
emancipation of the law of nations from the Roman law and its emergence as a 
autonomous discipline of public law – he constantly referred to the writers of the law of 
nations as ‘public jurists’ – a step forward. Nevertheless, he did not take this ‘public’ 
character to the point of rejecting the direct application of international law to private 
citizens. Probably in part because of this, he had no qualms with the historical role of the 
Roman law during the Middle Ages and did not deny its persistent role with some writers 
of the 16th and 17th centuries. Nor was he in any way vocal or passionate in denouncing 
its role. Most of all, he took the trouble of explaining it – with the help of Von Savigny – 
by historically analysing the entanglement of natural law, law of nations and civil law. 
Though as Ward, Wheaton did not accept the reduction of the law of nations to a kind of 
natural jurisprudence, his moderate stance in the naturalist-positivist debate and his 
nuanced view on the autonomy of international law as public law based on his familiarity 
with practice, made him quite dispassionate in relation to the role of Roman private law 
in the formation of modern international law. 
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4. John Hosack (1882) 
 
John Hosack (1809-1887) was a legal practitioner. Born in Dumfries, he was called to the 
bar by the Middle Temple in 1841. Ten years before he died, he became a police 
magistrate at Clerkenwell, London. Hosack also served as an examiner for constitutional 
and international law at the Middle Temple. He published several books and essays in the 
fields of law and history.84 In 1882, he published a history of the law of nations, entitled 
On the Rise and Growth of the Law of Nations, Established by General Usage and 
Treaties, from the Earliest Time to the Treaty of Utrecht.85 
 As the subtitle indicated, Hosack’s history was above all a history of state 
practice. Actually, it was much more a diplomatic history outlining wars, negotiations 
and treaties, than a legal history. Surprisingly, the only chapter in which Hosack gave 
more than a passing glance to legal matters was the first one, on the ancient Greeks and 
Romans (1-22). 
 Hosack held to a relative conception of the law of nations. From the time there 
had been independent communities, there had been a law regulating their intercourse. 
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Hosack based the law of nations ultimately on the man’s social nature, as it was this that 
brought him outside his own community and caused him to have relations with other 
communities. 
 
Throughout all periods of authentic history we find that certain international 
obligations have been regarded as binding upon mankind. From the time, indeed, 
when distinct political communities began to be formed, the establishment of 
some definite rules to be observed towards strangers would naturally suggest 
itself. The enterprising nature of man and his migratory habits would lead him 
frequently to wander beyond the limits of his birthplace, and an intercourse 
between neighbouring states, being once opened up, would, without some 
disturbing cause, be continued and extended on some footing of reciprocity. The 
law of nations may, therefore, be said to have its origin in the social nature and 
the necessities of man.86 
 
For Hosack, natural law helped to explain why the ancients had been capable of 
developing the law of nations to such an extent. Hosack was much more appreciative of 
the contribution of the ancients than either Ward or Wheaton.  
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With regard to the positive law of nations, as it is understood and recognised in 
modern times, we are much more indebted to the ancients than is commonly 
supposed.87 
 
Hosack referred to the general respect for the sacred duties of hospitality and underscored 
the many examples of solidarity between the peoples of Antiquity. Hosack went on to 
enumerate many examples of how the ancient law of nations had paved the way for the 
modern one: the immunity of diplomats, the abiding to treaties, the respect for the rights 
of neutrals during war, the introduction of notions such as asylum, blockade or 
contraband. Hosack did concede that the amphyctionic council was not a body of 
arbitration or an international tribunal, but it was a useful precedent thereof, not in the 
least because it instructed us about the difficulties of establishing such an institution. The 
ancients were also certainly familiar with the balance of power; after all, it was dictated 
by man’s natural inclination to self-preservation.  
 According to Hosack, the Greek practices of war were surprisingly cruel for such 
a highly cultivated people. Among the peoples of Antiquity, the Romans were certainly 
commendable for their high standards of ‘public morality.’ He referred to the jus fetiale, 
which had a mitigating impact on warfare. Hosack had, however, to concede that their 
successes had changed the nature of the Romans and had led them in later times 
continuously to violate the law of nations. 
 But in general, so Hosack concluded his chapter on ancient law, ‘many of the 
leading principles of the law of nations come down to us from a period of remote 
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antiquity.’88 Since these times, the law of nations – and particularly, the laws of war – 
had been much improved, thanks to Christianity and commerce. Still, modern civilisation 
too had ‘its dark spots.’ The African slave trade was after all ‘of modern growth’ and was 
condoned by the law of nations. On this point, so Hosack concluded, we must be content 
‘to suffer in comparison with the civilised nations of antiquity.’89 
 Hosack’s evaluation of the contribution of the Greeks and Romans to the modern 
law of nations and of the continuity between ancient and modern law, was almost 
diametrically opposed to that of Ward and Wheaton. But he also thought in terms of the 
civilisation process. What led him – apart from a most probable influence from Henry 
Sumner Maine (1822-1888) whose Ancient Law first appeared in 1861 – to be much more 
appreciative of the Greek and Roman laws and practices, was the failure of modern man 
to live up to the standards of civilisation as well. 
 In the following chapters, Hosack traced the growth and development of what he 
referred to as the ‘modern public law of Europe.’ He set great stall on the humanising 
impact of Christianity, but apart from that, it was mostly a survey of wars and peace 
treaties. At no time, any reference to the law of nature – or the law of nations properly 
speaking for that matter – was made again. Unsurprisingly, Hosack made no mention of 
the significance of the civil law in the formation of the modern law of nations. 
 
 
5. Thomas Alfred Walker (1899) 
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Thomas Alfred Walker (1862-1935) studied history, economics and law. In 1886, he 
entered the Middle Temple and qualified for the bar, but then decided upon an academic 
career. He became a fellow, tutor, lecturer and librarian at Peterhouse, Cambridge and 
taught both international law and history. Walker served as examiner in the Cambridge 
Law Tripos, and as an examiner in constitutional history, Roman law, jurisprudence and 
international law at the University of London. In 1896, Walker took holy orders. In 1924, 
he left Peterhouse to become Rector at Witnesham.90 Apart from being a historiographer 
of his own college,91 he also published three books on international law. In 1893, The 
Science of International Law appeared, followed in 1895 by A Manual of Public 
International Law.92 The first book delved into the theoretical foundations of the 
discipline, while the second was more practical. The Science included a survey of the 
development of diplomacy and state practice before Grotius (57-90) and an analysis of 
Grotius’s contribution (91-111). In 1899, Walker followed this up with the first of a 
planned two volumes on the history of the law of nations, entitled A History of the Law of 
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Nations. This first book, subtitled From the earliest times to the Peace of Westphalia, 
1648, which actually led up to the Grotius, was to remain the only one.93 
 In the preface to his treatise on international law from 1893, Walker 
acknowledged his indebtedness to the ideas of Maine, who had been both Regius 
Professor of Civil Law (1847-1854) and Whewell Professor of International Law (1887-
1888) at Cambridge as well as Master of Trinity Hall (from 1877).94 In the first chapter to 
his Science of International Law, which found its way in an abridged version in his 
historical monograph, Walker took great trouble in denouncing Austin’s definition of law 
and his refusal to use the term law to indicate international law. Austin’s definition of law 
was far too restrictive. It did not answer to the different understandings of law men had 
held through history. Walker also denied Austin the right ‘to dictate, to deny the validity 
of the name “Law” to such other varieties of rule as have hitherto enjoyed the 
appellation.’95 Refusing to call international law just that would only serve to weaken the 
bonds of obligations between States. Among others, as Maine had spelled out, this 
position was hurtful to ‘the peace of the world’ as Austin’s criticisms ‘passed outside the 
schools into the Cabinet, and into the public speeches of responsible Foreign Ministers.’96 
 Walker defined law as follows: 
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A ‘Law’ is a rule of conduct observed, or otherwise recognised as binding, by 
men, and observed or otherwise recognised by them as wearers of a particular 
character, that is, as members of a particular body.97 
 
International law answered to this definition. Rules of international law were to be 
understood as 
 
(…) rules of conduct observed by men towards each other as members of 
different States, though members of the same International Circle.98 
 
After having in his own eyes sufficiently debunked Austin’s views, Walker stated that the 
only thing left to do was to prove through the study of history that such rules of 
international law existed.  
 
The proof of the allegation can, it is clear, be only furnished by History and direct 
observation. So the available authorities are every written document, every record 
of act or spoken word which presents an authentic picture of the practice of States 
in their international dealings.99 
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According to Walker, these included the writings of men of authority, treaties, the 
ordinances of States, the adjudications of international tribunals, the opinions of official 
jurists and the documents attesting the history of war, negotiations and treaties. The 
writers of international law only offered relevant information inasmuch as they did ‘their 
duty’ and were ‘impartial historians of International Law.’ 
 
To them it belongs to note actual facts and events, and to extract from them the 
broad principles for the future guidance of mankind. The authority they possess, 
they possess not as judges, but as skilled observers and relaters, and that authority 
will increase or decrease, accordingly, according as their representations present, 
or do not present, an accurate picture of actual reality. When the text writer 
becomes a theorist, it is time for men to look askance of this opinion. 100 
 
It may be so that the opinions of great writers, such as Grotius or Vattel, had influenced 
the opinions of their age, but that was in turned owed ‘to the strength of their intellect and 
the soundness of their appreciation of the moral needs of their times.’ In no way must 
they be treated as if they were ‘makers of law. The information of the text writers is 
commonly second hand.’101 
 Throughout Walker’s oeuvre, it is implied that at different times and places 
different ‘international circles’ and thus different international legal systems existed.  
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(…) a corpus of International Law at any period must be the creation of the then 
prevalent International System, that is, of the prevailing concept of a state and of 
the bonds binding state to state.102 
 
The basis for the modern international law of ‘civilised States’ was territorial 
sovereignty.103 As ‘a matter of scientific appreciation’ international law had only truly 
emerged from the Peace of Westphalia on, or better, with Grotius.104 The international 
law of the civilised States was dictated by ‘the natural characteristics of those 
communities’ and by ‘the moral influences arising from their surroundings.’ In this, 
States were not fundamentally different from individual human beings, and international 
law was not from municipal law.105 
 Walker underscored the moral character of international law. He was a positivist 
to the extent that he looked for the evidence of international law in the positive 
enactments of States and that he claimed territorial sovereignty to form the basis of 
modern international law. But at the same time, he stressed that States, which were after 
all composed of men, were affected by the self-same human nature and the self-same 
human morality. The influence of Maine spoke.106 
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While nations recognise the conception of territorial sovereignty as containing the 
main general principles of their just mutual dealings, they are, as being composed 
of men, obnoxious to external moral influences; in a word, nations are moral 
entities, and enlightened self-interest playing its part in the field of international 
intercourse, by the needs of that intercourse, if not by the operation of the forces 
of pure benevolence, the strict principles of territorial sovereignty and its 
corollaries must be at times affected and relaxed. The progressive improvement of 
human nature necessarily involved the progressive development of International 
Law.107 
 
Walker did consider natural law to be ‘the expression for the action of Man of an innate 
moral force.’108 Inasmuch as human morality was a basis for international law, natural 
law, by consequence, was too. But the law of nation’s dependence on natural law was 
above all a historical fact. Walker did not seem keen on giving it an important place in 
his view on current international law. In this, Walker did not divert too far from 
Maine.109 Natural law held altogether less significance in his system of international law 
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than it had in that of other influential British international lawyers of the 19th century 
such as Sir Robert Phillimore.110 
The idea expressed in the last sentence from the preceding quotation permeated 
much of Walker’s oeuvre and constituted one of the cornerstones of his interpretation of 
international law’s history.111 Though the international law of civilised States, based as it 
was on territorial sovereignty, only emerged in the 17th century and had a totally different 
foundation from the older international law – which had, in truth been rather ‘Law 
Universal’ –,112 it was at the same instance another step in long history of the field, which 
was, a history of progress:  
 
The history of International Law is on broad lines the history of progress. And 
even within narrow bounds of time it is possible to trace advance.113 
 
Thus, Walker clung to the idea of modern civilisation as the summit of human 
achievement, while at the same time granting older times their place in the great story of 
that achievement.  
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 This vision of history also allowed Walker to give natural law its due in terms of 
its historical contribution. Walker acclaimed Grotius, critical though he was of him in 
many respects, because 
 
[h]is teaching rests on a certain foundation, on the foundation of the grandest fact 
in history. There is a Law of Nature, which is not a fleeting day-dream.114 
 
With Maine, Walker held that this natural law was identical to the law of God. It was also 
identical to the jus gentium of the classical Roman jurists.115 Walker recognised natural 
law to have played a significant role throughout history. And as the current international 
law was a result of a continuous progress, natural law had largely contributed to it.  
This idea of progress also sheds some more light on Walker’s understanding of 
natural law. To him, natural law, which was to be identified with divine law, was the 
innate moral force of Man. But as such, it was altogether less important to the articulation 
of international law than the gradual progress of man’s understanding of human morality. 
For Walker, international law was to be found in the positive enactments of States. 
Throughout time, these had improved and progressed, driven on by an improving and 
progressing human understanding of morality. International law was positively instituted 
and determined by man’s positive understanding of his innate morality. 
 After having summarised these notions on international law from his earlier books 
in his History of the Law of Nations, Walker then moved to the perusal of history. In the 
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first third (30-61) of the chapter that went up to the 16th century (30-137), he discussed 
Antiquity’s contribution to the law of nations. Before the Romans had conquered most of 
the Mediterranean and built their world empire, there was ‘ a fair field of International 
Law,’ because there were different independent communities and theirs was the need to 
regulate their relations with one another. Walker judged the laws of war of the two oldest 
peoples he discussed, the Israelites and the ancient Greeks, as ‘terribly severe’ while 
adding that ‘[i]t is by the war practice that the state of international legal advancement of 
a people may be most easily gauged.’116 But he was also keen to point at the more 
‘advanced’ elements in their law of nations, such as the inviolability of diplomats and 
treaties. All in all, Walker was dispassionate and seemed objective is his judgment on 
Israelite and Greek law, with the one exception that he attributed it to the ‘Greek temper’ 
that the rules were often trampled on. The notion of Greek emotionality as opposed to the 
Roman stoicism was a popular idea of the 19th century.117 But above all, both the laws of 
the Israelites and the Greeks were ‘improving law[s].’118 
Walker focused on the distinction the Greeks made between relations among 
themselves and those with the ‘barbarian’ nations. These were governed by a kind of 
‘universal law.’ 
 
It may be that on closer examination these laws reveal themselves rather as laws 
universal, rules of conduct observed by all men as men, than as laws 
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international, rules of conduct observed by men as state members towards the 
members of a political aggregate.119 
 
Nevertheless, it did function as a kind of international law. In Walker’s telling of the 
history of international law, this Greek ‘universal law’ served as a logical steppingstone 
towards the Roman the jus gentium. Walker correctly understood the Roman jus gentium 
to be a kind of private law applied to foreigners. Whether it stemmed from an abstraction 
from elements common in different municipal private law systems or was just the Roman 
version of equity was of little significance to Walker. Much more important was that, 
apart from being universal private law, jus gentium also included rules pertaining to 
international relations such as diplomatic immunity. Although jus gentium was the 
nearest thing the Roman had to modern international law, it was universal law applicable 
to men as men, as not as ‘members of different bodies politic.’120 Greek philosophy 
brought the Romans to associate their jus gentium with than natural law. 
 
The Greek tutor explained this common observance, if the Roman pupil had not 
himself already conceived of some such ascription, by reference to a certain Jus 
Naturale or ό ί, a law which Nature herself had implanted in man, 
immutable and unchangeable, exact justice, self-evident to the individual 
exercising the right reason or the moral faculty with which he was endowed; but it 
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was the general recognition of this law, its character as a rule acknowledged by 
all peoples who observed any law, which first caught the Roman eye.121 
 
But Walker did not consider the Roman jus gentium to have been coterminous with 
natural law. He criticised Ulpian for having reduced the jus gentium to a mere law of 
nations by distinguishing it from jus naturale because the former only applied to men and 
the latter to men and beasts. Although the ultimate basis of jus gentium was jus naturale, 
it was ‘extracted primarily from actual practice.’122  
Apart from that, the Romans also had a jus fetiale. As a law of war, it was severe 
but the Romans tended to abide to the letter of it. Once Rome turned into a Mediterranean 
power and had regular intercourse with other powers around that sea, ‘a fair field existed 
for a true International Law.’ Polybios’s work clearly showed that, indeed, there now 
existed ‘a distinct society of civilised states of very considerable extent.’123 Walker 
clearly understood this as an international context, which in some ways prefigured the 
modern European States system. Under the Late Republic, two kinds or systems of 
international law co-existed. On the one hand, there was the Roman jus belli; on the other 
hand, the ‘common laws of mankind’ to which the jus gentium gave expression.  
 As the Roman Empire grew and expanded, the ‘Roman national character’ 
worsened. Walker, in the trail of many modern historians, partly attributed this to Rome’s 
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exposure to the ‘lax morality of the East.’124 By the time of the Emperor Trajan (98-117), 
Rome reached its greatest expansion and was turned into a world empire. Therefore, no 
room was left for a true international law. What was left was universal law, a true world 
law. 
 
In a World State International Law must find its vanishing point. And in point of 
fact, a science of International Law in the Roman Empire had been little else than 
a science of World Law enforced by the arbitrament of a single supreme ruler 
amongst subject tribes, cities and vassal kings.125 
 
To the relations with other states, mostly a matter of ‘petty frontier wars,’ the Roman 
kept applying their jus belli and just fetiale. But a much more significant Roman 
heirloom was their jus gentium, which 
 
(…) lived on within the Empire alike as the ‘Law of all Mankind’ and as Roman 
Equity, to be employed in the moulding of Grotius and his successors of the 
International Law of to-day. And not only so: the extension of the Roman 
citizenship throughout the limits of the Empire completed the familiarisation of 
the whole western world with the magnificent creation of the Roman Civil Law, 
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and secured the easy incorporation into modern International Law of decision 
after decision of Roman municipal origin.126 
 
In these few phrases, Walker thus first introduced the subject of the historical impact of 
Roman private law upon the medieval and early-modern law of nations. Through his 
interpretation of Roman history, Walker had explained the associations between private 
and international law through the jus gentium. He also referred to the definition of jus 
gentium by Isidorus, which had strengthened the bonds between the Roman jus gentium, 
and thereby Roman civil law, and the law of nations properly speaking.127 
 In the codification of Justinian (527-565), the whole legal inheritance of the 
ancients was consummated and reached its peak: that of universality and the comity of all 
mankind.  
 
The lines of the narrow International Circles traced by the exclusive hands of 
Greek, Jew and Egyptian have been effaced by the sceptre of the common ruler; 
Laws of the Hellenes and laws among kindred Tribes have alike sunk into 
insignificance before the Law of Mankind and the Roman Civil Law.128 
 
In the history of international law, which was a story of progress to Walker, the role of 
the Israelites, the Greeks and, above all, the Romans had been to overcome the 
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differences and distinctions between different circles and formulate, or recognise, a 
universal law. This law was embodied in the Roman civil law and the Roman jus 
gentium. 
 Walker thus not only acknowledged the historical role the learned Roman law 
played in the formation and articulation of the law of nations during the Middle Ages, he 
also highly approved of it. Walker applauded the medieval students of Roman law to 
have corrected Ulpian’s faulty understanding of jus gentium and for having recognised it 
as something distinct from natural law, namely universal law. They did not reduce it to 
natural law, and thus saved its connections to the amalgam of private law formed by the 
Roman civil law and the law of nations. Through the study and use of the Roman jus 
gentium – and through it, the Roman civil law from which it had become all but 
inseparable – the medieval jurists contributed to the progress of the law of nations. 
 
The value attached by the mediaeval civilians to the letter of the written text 
would have effectually prevented their wide deviation from the lines of their 
predecessors, even had they been able to shake off entirely the influence of the 
Imperial theory. Their Public Law continued Law Universal; if they stumbled it 
was only fortuitously upon Jus Gentium as international law.129 
 
As Ward had done, Walker also mentioned that the medieval jurists often supported the 
Emperor’s claims to world dominium. Although this position was unrealistic, Walker did 
not attack them for it. To him, it was just another historical fact.  
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During the Middle Ages, the understanding of the different roles of natural law, 
law of nations and municipal law also found its way to canon law and to theology. The 
theologians and canon lawyers, just as the medieval Roman lawyers, learned to 
distinguish between law based on right reason and on common usage. Jus gentium was 
understood to be the product of both. This idea was further developed in the works of 
Fernando Vasquez and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). 
Defining the law of nations in, partly, positive terms and basing it upon usage, 
was, of course, instrumental in the development of the law of nations of the age of 
‘territorial sovereignty’ and the emergence of an autonomous science thereof. But Walker 
was very expressive in underscoring that even in the 16th and 17th centuries the writers of 
international law did not shrink away from taking inspiration from ‘the existing 
storehouses of accepted and systematized legal principles.’130 Walker found it perfectly 
natural for Mary Queen of Scots to have appealed to the Roman and civil law at the 
occasion of her trial in 1586, for Michel de L’Hôpital (c. 1505-1573), the French 
chancellor, to have appealed to Roman law over the return of Calais (1567) to the 
English, or for the English government to have done so in the case of the Bishop of Ross. 
No one less than Grotius had, after all, done the same. 
 
The most cursory examination of the legal literature of the Age of the 
Reformation will suffice to prove that not only the foundation-stone, but the 
material for all the lower tiers, of the Grotian system was furnished by the labours 
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of the canonist theologians of the Middle Ages and the classical jurists of the 
Roman Empire.131 
 
Great though Grotius’s contribution to the development of international law may be, his 
ideas were nothing ‘but the product of long centuries of slow evolution.’132 The greatest 
part of this historical inheritance was that of the civilians. Their work had not stopped 
with the Middle Ages but been continued by the humanist jurists of the 16th century. 
 
In these labours the foremost place was naturally taken by the Civilians. Irnerius, 
Bartolus, and Baldus were succeeded by a great galaxy of emulators, amongst 
whom in the age of Reformation Andrea Alciati, Francis Hotman, and Jacques 
Cujas shone preeminent.133 
 
Walker left it in no doubt that Grotius had acted wisely in building upon the work of his 
predecessors, and particularly, the civilians. 
 
The very fact that that he employed old material was a primary condition of his 
success. His use of Roman Law furnishes a salient example. The Roman Law, 
like the Roman Faith, had resisted the shocks of the Middle Ages by the strength 
of an innate moral power. It had trickled through Barbarian Codes, and come in 
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full stream through the Basilika and the Western commentators from the founts of 
Justinian. It had had its Professors in every great mediaeval University, and the 
common lawyer, who repudiated its sway, had borrowed on occasion largely of its 
dictates. What meaning was attached by Grotius to Jus Gentium in the mouths of 
Roman jurists it is of little more than curious interest to decide. Grotius, whilst he 
drew on all antiquity for precedents and proofs, had in the Roman Law an 
unfailing supply of principles; and he used it unsparingly. He did so with success 
because, made known by generations of mediaeval legal thinkers, the principles 
of Roman Civil Law yet spoke in the day of Grotius with the authority of the lex 
scripta. The obligatory force which men acknowledged in these principles as rules 
of a municipal legal system was accorded them when they were enunciated as 
laws of international conduct. The system of Grotius lived because it was grafted 





Apart from John Hosack, who kept silent about Roman private law, all four authors 
covered the two sides of the debate on the impact of Roman law on international law.
 None of them went so far as to deny the existence of a law of nations in ancient 
Roman times. All held to a sufficiently relative notion of the law of nations. But they all 
to some extent – Ward the least of all – weighed the ancients’ laws and practices in terms 
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of their contribution to the modern law of nations as a public law for the European system 
of sovereign states. This was, without a doubt, the superior system. 
Their view on the continuity between the Roman laws and practices in regards to 
international relation and the modern law of nations were coloured by contemporary 
ideas on the progress of civilisation. For Ward and Wheaton, the direct contribution to the 
modern law of nations of the ancients was small because of the inhumanity of their law, 
in particularly regarding warfare. The Greeks and Romans stood at a much lower level of 
civilisation and this reflected upon their law of nations. To both, and particularly to 
Ward, this illustrated the role of Christianity in the process of civilisation.   
 Hosack from his side stressed the continuity between the ancients and the 
moderns, but he also did not escape the discourse of civilisation. The Greeks and Romans 
may have been lacking in humanity in several instances, but so were the moderns – with 
reference to the African slave trade. Walker held the most nuanced views. To him, the 
matter of continuity between the Roman and modern ‘public international law’ was much 
less important than that of the continuity between the Roman universal – private – law 
and modern international law. 
 Ward, Wheaton and Walker acknowledged the historical link through medieval 
scholarship between Roman private law – both the Roman civil law and the jus gentium – 
and modern international law. But it was nevertheless a contentious issue. Ward 
passionately denounced it as a flaw and saw the emancipation of the law of nations from 
its Roman influences as its true moment of birth. What Ward took offence at was Roman 
law’s traditional association with the concept of universal jurisprudence and with natural 
law. Ward rejected the possibility of a universal and immutable jurisprudence based on 
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natural reason. Roman law, which was just the municipal law of a vanquished people, 
could thus not be the embodiment thereof and held no claims to dictating the rules and 
laws of nations.  
 Wheaton also judged the emancipation of the law of nations from Roman private 
law in terms of progress, without, however, denouncing the historical reality of its impact 
on the law of nations in any way. Wheaton was no adept of universal jurisprudence 
either, but he lived in an age when few international lawyers did. He did not feel the need 
to denounce the historical role of Roman law, which for him had lost its automatic 
association with universal jurisprudence and with natural law. From the other side, 
approaching the rules and precepts ruling the behaviour of States to those ruling the 
behaviour of individuals held some appeal to Wheaton, who as a practitioner and 
diplomat had been involved in many cases where the law of nations was indeed applied 
to individuals. To argue this point, Wheaton was keen to refer to the writings of Bentham 
and particularly Heffner, who had broken through the divide between the State and the 
individual, between public and private law, without needing natural law to do so. 
 The continuity between the Roman and the modern jurisprudence was the very 
cornerstone of Walker’s interpretation of the history of international law, for which he 
heavily borrowed from Henry Sumner Maine. Since the 17th century, international law 
might be public law regulating the relations between sovereign, territorial States, but 
these were ultimately subject to the impact of the same morals and nature as individual 
beings. Thus Walker inscribed the modern international law – at the top of the progress of 
humanity – into the long story that basically started with the Roman articulation, through 
right reason and actual practice, of a universal law. This applied both to men as men as 
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well as to men as members of a body politic. Walker did therefore consider the 
interaction between the Roman private and the international law as the great historical 
feature from before the 17th century. As opposed to Ward and Wheaton, he also 
recognised that Roman law’s influence had not stopped with the emergence of an 
autonomous science of international law. Fortunately, the great father of international 
law, Grotius, had passed this inheritance on in his work. Walker clearly did not consider 
the modern international law to be a completely self-sufficient body of law. Finally, he 
also liked to stress the positive dimension in the Roman law of nations and played down 
its traditional association to natural law. 
 The early historians of international law all viewed the question of the Roman 
contribution to modern international law in terms of their understanding of that law. As 
was the case during the 20th century, and as Lauterpacht had claimed, this reflected the 
great debate between positivists and naturalists. Of course, each waged that debate in the 
terms of his day and age. None of these authors reduced international law to mere 
positive public international law, regulating relations between sovereign States. None of 
them was over-concerned with consensualism and voluntarism, at least not directly. More 
central to the debate was the other issue Lauterpacht had forwarded: the question whether 
international law was or should be self-sufficient and, as such, autonomous of the laws 
that regulated relations between individual men – of private law. 
